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THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: TWENTIETH CENTURY 
PATTERNS AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
PROSPECTS* 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The prison has been far more important to criminal justice practice 
than to academic theory in the century examined by this Symposium.  
Imprisonment is the dominant severe criminal sanction worldwide and there 
is no evidence that its hegemony at the deep end of crime control will 
change.  But the study of imprisonment has not been a major feature of 
criminal law theory at any time, while some aspects of prisons have 
commanded attention in the literature of criminology.  So imprisonment has 
played a dominant role in American criminal justice but a minor role in the 
discourse about criminal law.  The Harvard Law Review, for example, 
listed twenty-seven articles with “prison” or “imprisonment” in the title in 
one hundred years of publication beginning in 1910. 
The interdisciplinary character of the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology and its crime focus made it into the leading forum in law-
related scholarship covering issues of prison operation and function.  No 
fewer than 155 main articles were published with “prisons” or 
“imprisonment” in their titles in a century of publications, by far the largest 
concentration one would find in any scholarly journal closely linked to legal 
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therefore share responsibility for some of the resulting analysis. 
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education.1  And prisons played a prominent part in the scholarly portfolio 
of the Journal from the very beginning, with slightly more articles on 
prisons in the first half of its volumes than in the second.  The range of 
prison-related topics covered from the beginning—including comparative 
and empirical work—was impressive. 
But little of the first half-century of the Journal touched on the central 
issue in this analysis—what I shall call the scale of imprisonment.  Zimring 
and Hawkins define the issue of scale as analysis of the appropriate “size of 
a society’s prison enterprise in relation to other criminal sanctions and to 
the general population.  How many prisoners?  How many prisons?  What 
criteria should govern decisions about how large a prison enterprise should 
be constructed and maintained?”2 
Only one of the more than seventy articles with prison in its title that 
appeared in the Journal in its first half-century was principally concerned 
with rates of imprisonment: an article by Edwin Sutherland describing the 
decline in rates of imprisonment in England.3  One important reason for the 
lack of scholarly attention to variation in the rate of imprisonment in the 
United States is that there was not a great deal of variation over time in the 
rate of imprisonment. 
Indeed, the lack of dramatic variation in rates of imprisonment inspired 
Alfred Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen to construct what they called “A 
Theory of the Stability of Punishment”4 in the Journal in 1973, probably 
the most important and certainly the most ironically timed article on 
imprisonment in the Journal’s first century.  Blumstein and Cohen posit 
that levels of severe criminal punishment trend toward stability over time 
and they offered as evidence of this phenomenon the rather stable rates of 
imprisonment in the national aggregate over the years 1930-1970.  Their 
Figure 2 is reproduced from Blumstein and Cohen as my Figure 1.  The 
interpretation of this data was straightforward: 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that over that period the imprisonment rate was 
reasonably constant, having an average value of 110.2 prisoners per 100,000 
population and a standard deviation during that time . . . of 8.9 prisoners per 100,000 
population . . . .  The stability of the time series is especially noteworthy when it is  
 
 
1 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology search was conducted by Journal staff 
while the Harvard search was conducted on January 22, 2010, by Ellen Gilmore, a reference 
librarian at the University of California, Berkeley Law Library. 
2 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT xi (1991). 
3 Edwin H. Sutherland, The Decreasing Prison Population of England, 24 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 880 (1934). 
4 Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 64 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1973). 
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Figure 1 
Imprisonment Rates in the United States, 1930-19705 
 
considered that the population of the United States increased by over 50 percent in 
the same period.6 
Twice more in the 1970s, Blumstein and his associates would produce 
data and analysis to augment their stability of punishment theory,7 but then 
their entire theoretical structure was overtaken by events.  From its low 
point in 1972, U.S. prison populations had begun a consistent and 
unprecedented climb.  Figure 2, taken from U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 
data, shows an uninterrupted increase in aggregate imprisonment rates that 
lasted the full generation after 1972. 
 
5 Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 4. 
6 Id. at 201. 
7 Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin, The Dynamics of a Homeostatic 
Punishment Process, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1977); Alfred Blumstein & 
Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of the Time Series of the Imprisonment Rate in the States of the 
United States: A Further Test of the Stability of Punishment Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 376 (1979). 
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Figure 2 
Imprisonment Rates per 100,000 Population, United States, 1925-20078 
 
 
The contrast between the four decades after 1930 and the three and a 
half decades after 1972 is stark.  The highest annual imprisonment rate in 
the 1930-1970 period was 38% above the lowest (131.5 versus 95.5 per 
100,000) and there was no clear trend over time.  In the thirty years after 
1972, the rate of imprisonment grew every year and the rate of 
imprisonment by 2007 was five times greater than at the beginning. 
The first impact on scholarship of this unprecedented increase in the 
use of prisons in the United States was to end any serious discussion of 
“stability of punishment.”  That theory was produced by flat trends over 
time in the United States after 1925 and was destroyed by the imprisonment 
boom that followed 1972. 
The second product of the sharp increase in American prison 
population was academic interest in what features of society and 
government might influence rates of imprisonment over time.  Once the 
dynamic and non-homeostatic qualities of imprisonment rates were 
established by the history of imprisonment after 1975, the causes of 
 
8 Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 4. 
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variation in imprisonment over time and cross-sectionally became an 
important topic for empirical analysis.  The same upward march in prison 
population that ended interest in stability of punishment generated curiosity 
about the scale of imprisonment as a variable in crime policy and 
governance. 
There are two parallels between the “stability of punishment” exercises 
of the 1970s and the more recent efforts to comprehend and measure what 
determines the scale of imprisonment in the United States.  The first 
important shared characteristic of these two lines of inquiry is that each 
theory was derived from and driven by empirical data.  For all its 
Durkheimian analysis, the inspiration for Blumstein and Cohen’s stability 
of punishment insight was the flat distribution of imprisonment rates over 
time in the United States, a pattern that invited speculation about its 
potential causes.  In that sense, the stability pattern was a practice in search 
of a theory before any explanation was produced.  The more recent work on 
the scale of imprisonment was also provoked by the changing trends that 
demanded explanation and analysis.  All of the recent studies of 
imprisonment scale have been inspired by these sharp increases, so here 
again the data to be explained arrive prior to the theories to be tested. 
The second parallel is an unjustified assumption of temporal 
normality.  Despite the fact that theories of stability and then of variability 
were inspired by provocative empirical trends, the analysis of historical data 
testing these theories has assumed that the periods to be analyzed are 
normal and typical.  In the earlier work, the observed stability was assumed 
to be representative of other periods as well, so that the generality of 
patterns observed could be expected.  Again, in the statistical explanations 
of the period after 1972, the empirical analysis has been assuming that the 
prison trends of the thirty years after 1972 are representative of other 
periods and public moods so that the statistical relationship and magnitude 
of effects noted in this period will hold for other times and conditions. 
This Article focuses on three aspects of the prison trends in the United 
States since 1975.  First, I discuss the size and generality of the increase in 
prison population with special emphasis on the features of government that 
make the pattern of growth so surprising.  Second, I identify and discuss 
two central empirical questions about the imprisonment boom after 1972.  
Part IV explores the effects of the analysis in Part III on the proper method 
of testing whether crime rates are important in predicting imprisonment.  
The final section of this Article asks whether and to what extent the 
volatility in the growth of prison populations might also signal that major 
drops in the scale of imprisonment might happen soon. 
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II. THE MAGNITUDE OF PRISON GROWTH 
The thirty-five years after 1972 produced a growth in rates of 
imprisonment that has never been recorded in the history of developed 
nations.  Figure 3 compares the rate of imprisonment in 1972 with the rate 
in 2007. 
Figure 3 
Imprisonment in 1972 and 2007, U.S. Rates per 100,000 
Source: Bureau of Census and Bureau of Justice Statistics 
The 502 per 100,000 rate of state and federal imprisonment is not only 
five times the rate of imprisonment in the base year of 1972 but also almost 
four times the highest level of imprisonment in the four decades prior to 
1970.  By the early 1980s, the U.S. prison population passed its previous 
high rate and continued a sharp increase without any pause for more than 
two additional decades.  In the generation after 1970, the rate of 
imprisonment in the United States doubled (between 1972 and 1988) and 
then doubled again. 
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When this growth began in the 1970s, the rate of imprisonment in the 
United States was on the high end of western democracies but not what 
statisticians would call an “outlier” totally apart from the other nations in 
the G7.9  But the rate of imprisonment achieved by 2007 in the United 
States was three times that of any fully developed nation at any point in the 
post World War II era.  So the extent of growth experienced by the United 
States in the thirty-five years after 1970 would be remarkable for any nation 
in any era.  But there are three aspects of the governmental and legal 
structure of the United States that make the uninterrupted upward march of 
prisoners nothing short of astonishing. 
The first distinct feature of U.S. government that should even out 
variations in prison population over time is the decentralized structure of 
criminal law and criminal punishment.  The national government is 
responsible for less than 10% of the persons incarcerated in the United 
States, with the fifty states each responsible for determining definitions of 
crimes and schedules of punishment and typically administering and 
funding prison systems.  This decentralized punishment policy means that 
the aggregate “rates of imprisonment” in Figure 1 and Figure 2 of this 
article are really an aggregate average from fifty-one different systems, 
each of which has responsibility and power to set autonomous policy for 
prisons.  These multiple decision points should moderate the extreme values 
of individual states and produce modest aggregate changes over time.  
Except that the moderating influence of aggregating fifty-one different 
systems was not very substantial in the generation after 1970.  While there 
was some variation in rates of growth from state to state, the overpowering 
trend was toward sustained high rates of growth.  Zimring and Hawkins 
identify the 1980s as the period when the push toward and beyond 
historically high rates of imprisonment became clear: 
As of 1980 only eleven states reported rates of imprisonment higher than at any 
previous point in the century.  But a cyclical hypothesis has been decisively disproved 
by prison population trends since 1980.  Forty-six of the fifty states report rates of 
imprisonment between 1985 and 1987 which are the highest they have experienced in 
a century.10 
The near unanimity of century-high imprisonment mentioned in the 
previous paragraph was noted in the mid-1980s, when the aggregate rate of 
imprisonment had only come near to completing its first doubling.  By the 
early 1990s the journey of state governments into unprecedented high rates 
of imprisonment had become universal if not uniform.  So decentralized 
 
9 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 150 tbl.6.6; see also FRANKLING E. ZIMRING & 
GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM 31 tbl.2.2 (1997). 
10 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 152. 
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power and multiple autonomous centers of policy power became the first 
structural feature of the American system that should have moderated the 
expansion of rates of imprisonment but didn’t to any significant degree. 
The second element of the U.S. system in the 1970s and 1980s that one 
would expect to moderate the growth of imprisonment was the absence of 
significant change in penal legislation during the first two decades of the 
great American prison expansion.  There was no general trend toward either 
increasing the number of crimes or escalating either minimum or maximum 
terms of imprisonment during the period from 1970 to 1985.  A few states 
shifted from indeterminate to determinant sentencing systems (including 
California and Illinois) in the 1970s, but there is no evidence that these 
structural changes had any significant impact on the growth of 
imprisonment during the period.11 
The wide discretion in determining punishments in the prosecution and 
sentencing systems of the United States mean that substantial changes in 
aggregate punishment policy can take place without any substantial change 
in the legislation governing the levels of punishment available or the choice 
of punishments in individual cases.  The first doubling of the U.S. prison 
population after 1972 is decisive evidence that the extraordinary latitude for 
exercise of discretion in American systems of criminal justice can produce 
very large changes in rates of imprisonment with no important changes in 
the legal framework of criminal punishment.  Because there are so few 
restrictions on discretionary choices in individual cases, a substantial shift 
in the choices made by prosecutors and judges and police can produce very 
sharp shifts in policy.  Certainly for the first fifteen years of the prison 
population expansion, this model of collective change in discretionary 
decisions is a much better model for explaining increases that any pattern of 
significant legal change.  The legal structures in place in the United States 
when it had a state prison population of 205,000 in 1972 were not greatly 
different from the legal structures that were responsible for 800,000 
prisoners in 1991. 
The third systemic element that might be expected to moderate the rate 
of prison growth in the United States is the relatively fixed number of 
prisons and space for prisoners in the United States.  Prisons are capital 
goods with high fixed costs, long useful lives, and substantial lead times 
between authorization and completion.  By the mid-1980s, over 90% of all 
the states in the United States were at the high point of the century for rates 
of imprisonment so that the relatively fixed resources in these places to 
house inmates were presumably close to their usual capacities.  Under these 
 
11 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 206 (Alfred Blumstein et al. 
eds., 1983). 
2010] THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 1233 
circumstances, the crowding of existing prison facilities would be expected 
to restrain the rate at which still more prisoners were sent to penal facilities.  
The highly discretionary processes that produce commitments to prison 
should be sensitive to population pressure without delay.  So the rate of 
prison population growth should have moderated after the first doubling of 
rates in the 1970s and 1980s as crowding pressures restrained prosecutors 
and judges from unlimited expansion policies, but this did not happen.  
Even with the population of prisoners swelling to unprecedented numbers 
in the 1990s, the expansion of incarceration continued, new facilities were 
constructed, and old prisons were retrofitted to accommodate larger 
populations.  The single cell became the double cell and, not infrequently, 
the triple cell.  So inertial forces which would ordinarily be expected to 
substantially slow the expansion of prison populations were overwhelmed 
by whatever systemic and political forces were driving prison expansion. 
Perhaps the continual expansion of prisons tells us that capacity 
restraints and decentralized punishment power were overestimated as 
moderating forces on prison growth.  But the unrestrained momentum of 
prison population growth after 1970 shows also that the political forces 
which drove the penal expansion were substantial and had substantial 
impact.  This may be of some importance in predicting the size and speed of 
any future downward pressure on imprisonment. 
III. TWO FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 
The thirty-five annual entries in the national portrait of rates of 
imprisonment after 1972 in Figure 2 give the impression of a single national 
pattern and a continuous upward trajectory.  But looks can be deceiving.  
This section addresses two fundamental questions about the character of the 
thirty-five-year growth in rates of imprisonment.  The first part of this 
section discusses whether the aggregate growth of imprisonment in the fifty 
states and the federal system is best viewed as (a) a single process with 
fifty-one different levels of government participating in essentially similar 
transformations of policy or (b) an aggregation of different levels or types 
of policy change.  The second part of the section addresses whether the 
thirty-five years of increase are a single era of growth or are composed of 
two or three distinct and discrete eras with different causes and magnitudes. 
A. ONE PROCESS OR MANY? 
The aggregate growth rates portrayed in Figure 2 are the sum of data 
from fifty-one different governmental systems.  As a matter of political 
science and perhaps of logic, it is inaccurate to speak of the rate of 
imprisonment in the United States as a single measure or to speak of the 
growth rate of imprisonment in the United States as a unitary phenomenon.  
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But noting the multiplicity of different components of policy in American 
penality is the beginning, rather than the end, of the analysis that I am 
suggesting is required.  Despite the large number of states and the diversity 
of their social and demographic composition, it is not unusual for 
nationwide trends to be evident in matters relating to crime and punishment.  
One recent example of a plenary national trend was the sharp decline in 
reported serious crime in the United States during the 1990s.12  Zimring and 
Hawkins noted in 1991, “one of the most puzzling features of recent 
decades is the way in which the many political units that share power in the 
American criminal justice system altered their policies in a way that 
increased prison populations at the same time and with similar intensity.”13 
The fourfold increase in the imprisonment rate in the United States 
obviously must be a broad trend to produce an aggregate impact that large.  
But there are two rather different patterns that can produce large growth in 
the aggregate.  The large growth numbers can mask very large differences 
between highest growth and lowest growth jurisdictions where there are 
significant differences between one cluster of jurisdictions and another.  In 
that case, aggregate growth levels are not the best way to study the causes 
of differential growth.  The differences between states will be at least as 
important as national trends over time. 
But the large number of states might all be more or less evenly 
participating in a national trend, in which case studying the factors 
associated with different rates of growth in different states will not provide 
an obvious key to the states’ shared characteristics that are the main causes 
of growth in all states.  This methodological point was argued by Zimring 
and Hawkins: 
At stake . . . is the appropriate unit of analysis for imprisonment policy.  To the extent 
that the United States is a single social system, approaches that view variations in 
imprisonment as an outgrowth of social and economic processes would emphasize the 
national scale as a unit of analysis . . . [t]o the extent that prison population is best 
viewed as an outcome of conscious governmental choice . . . the most significant  
political power over imprisonment is exercised at the state level and the state should 
be the significant unit of analysis.14 
While Zimring and Hawkins spotted an important issue, their analysis 
jumps to premature conclusions about the appropriate level of government 
for studies of the scale of imprisonment.  Even if the major influences on 
rates of imprisonment are political, the mechanisms that produce political 
 
 
12 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 3-24 (2007). 
13 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at 137. 
14 Id. at 137-38. 
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change at the state level may be national in scope and might best be studied 
at the national aggregate level.  If most states respond in relatively uniform 
ways to a national-level stimulus, interstate variation should not be the 
central focus of the search for causal factors. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of percentage growth in rates of 
imprisonment for the U.S. federal system and the fifty states. 
The pattern of state rate growth most consistent with a unitary national 
trend over the time period would show the largest concentration of states in 
the middle of the distribution with very few states at both extremes.  The 
model for this type of pattern is a normal distribution around a mean value.  
To the extent that extreme values are found, they should tend to be in 
smaller states, and there should not be any clear pattern of regional 
clustering in one part of the distribution.  That pattern would be a 
distribution consistent with a unitary national trend. 
A pluralistic distribution would not concentrate in the center of the 
growth rate scale, would have clusters of cases at some distance from the 
mean, and would produce clusters of cases with apparent similarities in 
geography, crime, or politics and different characteristic growth rates.  To 
the extent that a distribution suggests a unitary pattern, the appropriate level 
of analysis is the national aggregate.  To the extent that plural clustering is 
evident in the distribution, the explanation of patterns of state variation 
becomes an important focus of inquiry.  But which is distribution is present 
in Figure 4? 
A formal statistical analysis confirms the visual impression that the 
pattern of state growth rates over 1972-2007 is consistent with a normal 
distribution.  We use the fifty state growth rates as our sample set because 
they were produced in the same fashion.  The federal data are excluded 
from this analysis.  Two statistical tests analyze how often a distribution of 
fifty outcomes (in this case percent growth in state imprisonment rate) like 
that shown in Figure 4 would be likely to occur as chance variations from a 
normal distribution.  They are the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests 
each named after its creators.15  Table 1 shows the fifty state results for the 
growth rates reported in Figure 4. 
 
15 J.P. Royston, A Simple Method for Evaluating the Shapiro-Francia W' Test of Non-
Normality, 32 STATISTICIAN 297 (1983); Patrick Royston, Estimating Departure from 
Normality, 10 STAT. MED. 1283 (1991); S.S. Shapiro & M.B. Wilk, An Analysis of Variance 
Test for Normality (Complete Samples), 52 BIOMETRIKA 591 (1965); S.S. Shapiro & R.S. 
Francia, An Approximate Analysis of Variance Test for Normality, 67 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 
215 (1972). 
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Table 1 
The Probable Normality of Distribution of Imprisonment Growth Rates of 
Fifty U.S. States16 
Test Obs. W V Z Probability > Z 
Shapiro-Wilk 50 0.97322 1.259 0.492 0.31151 
Shapiro-Francia 50 0.97985 1.045 0.085 0.46612 
 
The smaller the probability that this is a fifty-case sample from a 
normal distribution, the more likely the pattern of difference observed is not 
normal, with a probability of 0.05 or less a usual benchmark for strong 
statistical evidence of non-normal distribution.  But using a Shapiro-Wilk 
test produces a probability of normal distribution of 0.31151 and the 
Shapiro-Francia test probability is 0.46612.  The question these tests 
address is “how likely” it is that a distribution like the one being tested 
could be the outcome of sampling fifty readings from a normal distribution.  
The answer is “pretty likely.”  There are thus no indications in these 
analyses of anything other than fifty different outcomes of a uniform 
process. 
B. ONE POLICY ERA OR THREE? 
When trends in national rates of imprisonment are charted over time in 
Figure 2, the visual image is of two discrete trends—a flat and relatively 
stable period from 1930 to about 1970 and a second continuously upward 
period of uninterrupted growth.  While the upward trajectory of increased 
rates of imprisonment moderates as the base rate of prison population 
increased in the 1980s and early 1990s, the number of prisoners added to 
the U.S. population remained between 300,000 and 437,000 for each five 
year period between 1985 and 2000.17  So the visual temptation in a graph 
like Figure 2 is bifurcation into a single era of stability and a single era of 
growth. 
It is however one thing to note that a growth rate has been constant 
over a long period of time and quite another to assume that the substantive 
influences that were driving increases in prison population in the late 1970s 
are the same that were operating in the 1980s and remained stable in the 
1990s.  There are some indications that policy emphasis changed over the 
generation of growing rates with higher rates of commitment for a wide 
 
16 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid 
=13#key_facts; Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Topics/ 
Topic.aspx?TopicID=1. 
17 See the comparison of growth rates and numbers in ZIMRING, supra note 12, at 50 
fig.3.5. 
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range of felonies being more important in the period prior to 1986, greater 
proportionate growth in drug and sex crimes being of greater significance 
from the mid 1980s to the mid-1990s, and with legislative increases in 
prison terms and longer prison sentences showing a more important role in 
the decade after 1995.18 
Without a doubt the changes in emphasis and priority over time during 
the different eras turn generalization over the entire growth period about 
causes of imprisonment growth into a hazardous occupation.  The sharp 
growth not only in drug prisoners, but in the percentage of state prisoners 
sentenced for drug crime between 1987 and 199119 suggest different causal 
paradigms for earlier prison growth than during the drug war’s peak years. 
But there may be more unity in the process of prison growth than 
preoccupation with the changing characteristics of crimes and sentences 
would allow.  To the extent that a relatively fixed expansion of 
imprisonment might be either desired or tolerated in the years after 1972, 
the crimes or sentence lengths that are added to reach that level may not be 
an important influence on the motivation or tolerance for prison growth.  To 
the extent, then, that the relatively constant growth of imprisonment before 
and after the peak emphasis on the war on drugs indicates that drug 
offenders simply crowded out marginal property offenders or restrained 
longer prison sentences for street criminals when they took priority in the 
late 1980s, the drug panic was not itself a primary cause of change in the 
growth rate of imprisonment.  To the unknown extent that the pace of 
national prison expansion operated independently of the categories of cases 
that were given emphasis in filling the new space, the conception of the 
post-1972 growth of imprisonment as a unitary trend across thirty-five 
years is plausible. 
IV. DOES CRIME MATTER? 
This section of the analysis will apply the perspectives discussed in 
Part III to review the published work discussing the role of variations in 
crime rates as explanations for variations in the rate of imprisonment cross-
sectionally and over time.  Of the potential hypotheses to use in applying 
analytic tools for study of the scale of imprisonment, the link between 
variations in crime and variations in imprisonment is a natural priority for 
two reasons.  The link between crime volume and imprisonment volume 
should be a fundamental one, because criminal conviction is a necessary 
 
18 Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American 
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 329-34 (2005). 
19 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 
REGULATION OF VICE 219 fig.3 (2007).  
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condition for eligibility for prison.  All prisoners at any time are convicted 
criminals so that variations in the supply of crime and presumably criminals 
is one obvious source of variation in the amount imprisonment is used or 
demanded.  This essential linkage has produced a second condition that 
recommends the crime/imprisonment issue as a demonstration example—
the relatively large number of empirical studies published in this and other 
journals that have explored the topic and reported significant findings when 
crime rates are tested as an influence on relative growth of imprisonment in 
the era of prison expansion.  There have not been many published studies 
on the scale of imprisonment nor have a wide variety of different analytic 
strategies been used, but the crime/imprisonment relationship has still 
received as much attention as any other potential cause. 
Since criminal convictions are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions 
for imprisonment, an increase in convictions is one obvious reason why 
more people would be sent to prison, and one natural influence on the 
volume of convicted offenders is the volume of reported crimes.  Several 
published studies have found that variation in crime at the state level predict 
variations in the growth of imprisonment at the state level.  But a detailed 
comparison of the data analyzed suggests several limits to existing studies 
of the crime versus rates of imprisonment relationship. 
One limit of the current studies is that the time periods studied were 
during the post-1972 uninterrupted growth in rates of imprisonment.  Does 
growth in crime predict growth in imprisonment during periods with less 
growth to explain?  If not, the relationship of crime trends and prison trends 
may be much weaker in more “normal” periods of relative stability in 
imprisonment rates in which variations in rates of many crimes are not 
predictive of differential imprisonment growth. 
And even in periods of high growth in imprisonment, the type of 
growth most clearly associated with increasing prison numbers may have a 
large effect on the impact of crime rates on prison growth.  In the first era of 
growth from 1974 to 1987, the most prominent cause of incarceration 
growth was the increasing rate of imprisonment for high volume felonies at 
the margin between prison and lesser sanctions—burglary, auto theft, 
unarmed robbery, assault.20  Variations in crime rates might have a strong 
influence on prison use by increasing the number of such offenses just 
when the prison risk for such crimes was going up—the two forces might 
interact to redouble the risk increase that was occurring independently. But 
variations in reported part I or index crime (property crimes with victims 
and violent crimes of some seriousness) levels would not have as strong an 
 
20 See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, PRISON POPULATION AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY IN CALIFORNIA 14 (1992). 
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influence during an imprisonment policy focus driven by increases in 
sentenced drug offenders and non-rape sex offenders—the special features 
of the increase in imprisonment over the period 1987-1995, because there is 
no count of drug offenses or of non-rape sex offenses that would measure 
variations in the rate of these types of offenders.  So the relationship of 
variations in official crime rates to differential growth rates of state 
imprisonment should be much weaker in an era of special emphasis on 
these non-index crimes.  In fact, many of the studies that find strong 
crime/imprisonment links involved data from the first period of increasing 
prison risk for marginally serious index crimes (e.g., Table 1 in Pfaff).21  
For this reason, such studies probably overestimate the impact on official 
rates of index crime and prison population even for the entire set of high 
growth eras. 
And because these studies were only attempting to access the role of 
differential crime growth in explaining state-to-state differences in growth 
of imprisonment, the studies that were conducted produce no direct 
evidence on the question of how much of the growth in imprisonment at the 
national level was driven by the growth of crime.  The greater the likelihood 
that a single national-level process was taking place during the period 
beginning in the 1970s, the more appropriate it becomes to explore the 
relationships between crime and imprisonment over time at the national 
level. 
Figure 5 uses homicide rates over time as a proxy for crime trends 
nationally and compares temporal trends for homicide and imprisonment 
rate per 100,000 for the United States as a whole. 
Homicide is selected as one proxy for serious crime because it is 
reliably reported and a good index of variation in rates of life threatening 
violence.22  Over the forty-three years after 1964, the observed rates of 
homicide and imprisonment are on very different trend lines.  Homicide 
rates double between 1964 and 1974 in the United States, while 
imprisonment rates continue to decline until 1973.  When imprisonment 
rates begin to rise over the late 1970s, homicide rates first fall then increase 
back to just above the 1974 high in 1980, then drop substantially until 1984, 
increase from 1986 to 1991, then drop steadily throughout the 1990s and 
level off in the years after 2000. 
 
 
21 John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2008). 
22 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 9, at 67-71. 
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The temporal pattern for imprisonment shows little of the cyclical 
variations of homicide.  Imprisonment drifts downward for eight years and 
then turns up for thirty-five years.  One might argue that the increase in 
homicide in the late 1960s starts to drive imprisonment upward after a long 
lag, but an eight-year gap between the increase in killings and the increase 
in imprisonment would be much larger than any standard economic or 
policy lags.  And the shape of the patterns for homicide and imprisonment 
are very different for the entire period rather than revealing similarities 
when lags are introduced.  There is a significant relationship between 
homicide and incarceration trends, but it is negative, (-0.53) over the period 
1964-2007.  This might be good news for those who suggest that 
imprisonment reduces crime, but it is bad news for advocates that crime 
rates drive imprisonment rates. 
Figure 6 shows trends in robbery and imprisonment to parallel the 
homicide story. 
This time, the overall relationship between robbery and imprisonment 
is nonexistent (-0.08), consistent with the two trends operating 
independently of any systematic interaction. 
Of course adding time lags and other statistical bells and whistles will 
produce variation in statistical outcomes.  But the central point of these 
exercises seems secure: the notion that variations in crime in the period 
after 1964 are driving imprisonment rates, which is clear in the study of 
interstate variations, is not well supported once attention shifts to the 
national aggregate.  So if that is the appropriate level of analysis (a 
plausible implication of a normal distribution of growth rates at the state 
level), it’s back to the drawing board. 
V. IS VOLATILITY A ONE-WAY STREET? 
In retrospect, the mid-1970s witnessed a transition between relatively 
stable imprisonment trends to sharp upward variation in incarceration rates.  
But the description of prison population trends as “volatile” in this period 
may be inaccurate if that term is intended in its ordinary economic or 
linguistic sense of changeable or “tending to fluctuate sharply and 
regularly.”  The recent history of imprisonment in the United States has 
established that populations tend to fluctuate sharply and regularly, but only 
in an upward direction.  The “average” increase in incarceration rate per 
100,000 population has been about fourfold, a very substantial variation 
indeed.  And there is strong evidence in recent years that growth rates have 
declined and increases in aggregate population levels are, by recent 
standards, quite small.  Some state systems have declining rates of 
imprisonment already, and there is reason to believe that stability and 
decline may touch many systems in the near future. 
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So declining rates of imprisonment are a likelihood at some point in 
the American near term.  What is not known is the scale of decline that 
might follow the increases of recent history.  Are the large increases of 
recent history indications that the downward variations in incarceration 
rates might approach the scale of the post-1973 increases?  Or are there 
inertial forces in the politics or governance of imprisonment that can be 
expected to restrain the downward variation of prison population so that 
cyclical movements appear non-symmetrical?  Illustrations of the 
contrasting arithmetic of symmetrical versus asymmetrical downward 
variation are not difficult to construct.  The equivalent of a 400% increase 
in prison population rate is an 80% decrease in rate per 100,000 from the 
inflated base rate of imprisonment back to break even.  Is downward 
variation of that magnitude either possible or likely in a thirty-year frame of 
the twenty-first century? 
There are no downward variations in prison population of that scale in 
the history of any developed nation on earth, just as there were no 
precedents for the statistical growth documented in Figure 2 until it 
happened.  The number of significant decreases in prison populations in 
U.S. history is rather small, and the size of recorded declines to date are far 
less than half the 80% decline that would constitute statistical symmetry 
with the late twentieth-century increase.  California produced a decline in 
rates of imprisonment in the early 1970s of approximately 30%,23 and the 
New York State system, dominated by New York City prisoners, has 
dropped in the wake of the city’s 80% drop in most forms of serious 
crime.24  The early California experience lasted just under a decade before it 
was overtaken by increases in the 1980s. 
The extent to which the scale of current imprisonment is reversible is a 
question not of statistics but of the political economy of imprisonment.  
There are a variety of institutional and political reasons why prison 
population rates might be stickier on the way down than they proved to be 
on the way up.  Once the physical capacity to imprison has been expanded, 
there may be inertial forces or economies of scale that bias systems to 
continue to use them.  The expanded scale of prison capacity may also 
reflect changing public preferences for imprisonment and these preferences 
may endure independent of any real economies in the variable costs of 
incarceration.  And while public preferences and values may not have 
strong independent influence on rates of imprisonment, this attitudinal 
 
23 Rosemary Gartner, Anthony Doob & Franklin Zimring, The Past Is Prologue? 
Decarceration in California: Then and Now, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 
2011). 
24 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE!, NEW YORK AND THE FUTURE OF 
CRIME CONTROL ch. 8 (forthcoming 2011). 
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software might interact with changes in both crime rates and public fear of 
crime to create political pressures for penal expansion or limits on 
contraction. 
Of all the modern historical trends in imprisonment, the period after 
1994 presents the most impressive evidence of asymmetrical volatility for 
American imprisonment.  This was the era when imprisonment rates in the 
United States defied gravity, when incarceration rates increased while crime 
rates decreased.  To the extent that the attitudes and political circumstances 
of the middle and late 1990s hold in the future, the case for volatility as a 
one-way street is quite strong.  But there are two reasons to suspect that the 
conditions that obtained in the late 1990s will vary.  The first issue is that 
longer exposure to stable or declining crime rates might reduce fear and 
soften public hostility.  There may be time lags of some size before 
declining crime and violence is transformed into assumptions of social 
safety.  The slowing of growth in incarceration rates seven and eight years 
after the crime decline started may be a typical lag between statistics and 
perception in public safety. 
There is a second respect in which the 1990s may not be representative 
of future attitudes toward crime and punishment.  The mid-1990s was an 
era of punitive hostility unparalleled in modern U.S. history and this may 
not have been closely linked to crime rates.  The era of three strikes and 
truth in sentencing may have been driven by unsustainable levels of fear 
and hostility rather than a continuing chronic condition.  What we know for 
sure after the mid-1990s is that the software of public fear and concern is 
more predictive of policy than any trends in crime or drug use.  What is not 
known is the variability of public attitudes in the second and third decade of 
the twenty-first century.  Stay tuned! 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Just as theories of stability of punishment followed sustained periods 
of little change in prison population, a concern with explaining wide 
variations in rates of imprisonment grew out of the fourfold expansion of 
rates of imprisonment in the United States in the generation after 1970.  
Among the long list of unanswered questions about the determinants of 
rates of imprisonment is whether the dramatic rise in prison population over 
the past decades is a new norm for the scale of imprisonment or a precursor 
to significant declines in the rates of imprisonment in the early decades of a 
new century. 
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